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ABSTRACT  
This paper investigates the emergence and development of the innovation platform in a nascent 
industry, through a dynamic capabilities perspective. Based on an inductive study of the UK’s 
tele-rehabilitation through gaming (TRTG) industry, we identify four capabilities that are 
important for successful platform development: innovation leverage, market exploration, 
quality control, and appropriation. A holistic framework is developed to explain how these 
capabilities can facilitate platform development by enabling appropriate business models and 
activities. We then discuss how a firm could define and redefine its firm boundary in order to 
deploy the four capabilities for platform development.  
Keywords: innovation platform; dynamic capabilities; nascent industry. 
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Platform development:  
Emerging insights from a nascent industry 
 
This study examines the emergence and development of the innovation platform, which 
consists of a core component that can be shared by complementors to develop useful 
complements for customers, and the interface through which these complements are 
connectable to the core component (Cusumano, Gawer & Yoffie, 2019; Gawer, 2014; 
Jacobides, Cennamo & Gawer, 2018; Tiwana, Konsynski & Bush, 2010). At the interface 
between the core and the complements, a platform firm may also provide boundary resources 
(Eaton, Elaluf-Calderwood, Sørensen & Youngjin, 2015; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013), 
such as application programming interfaces (APIs), software development kits (SDKs), game 
engines, technical standards, and rules that facilitate the use of the core component to build its 
complements.  
Innovation platforms have been developing rapidly worldwide across different 
industries. Examples include video games (e.g., PlayStation and its games), PCs (e.g., the Intel 
microprocessor and other hardware components; Microsoft Windows and Windows-based 
programmes), web browsers (e.g., Google Chrome and extensions), smartphones (e.g., iPhone 
and its apps), and smart homes (e.g., Amazon Alexa and peripheral devices). With the spread 
of these platforms, the focus of value creation has been moving towards networks. The platform 
firms and their complementors, therefore, form platform ecosystems that make the platforms’ 
offerings more valuable to the customers (Cusumano & Gawer, 2002; Jacobides et al., 2018). 
According to the United Nations’ Digital Economy Report, the combined value of platform 
firms with a market capitalization of more than US$100 million was estimated at more than $7 
trillion in 2017 – 67% higher than in 2015 (UNCTAD, 2019).  
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How do these innovation platforms come into being and evolve over time? Prior studies, 
including the related conceptual discussions (e.g., Dhanaraj & Parkhe (2006) and Nambisan & 
Sawhney (2011)), have focused primarily on successful platforms in established industries to 
understand the factors behind their successes (Cusumano, 2010; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014; 
McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Because these studies are mostly based only on snapshots of 
established and successful platforms, their discussions tend to pay insufficient attention to the 
early stages of platform development in nascent industries; rely on understanding the de facto 
status of the platforms as well as the platform firms, the complementors, their activities, and  
associated interactions; and underplay the dynamic and evolving nature of the actual platform 
development process (Dattée, Alexy & Autio, 2018; de Reuver, Sørensen & Basole, 2018; 
Gawer, 2014).  
This issue can be vital and yet challenging when comprehending the platform 
phenomenon, particularly its emergence and in nascent settings, because the success of a 
platform depends on concurrent inputs from various stakeholders that can be unclear and 
constantly evolving at the platform and the industry’s early stages. For instance, Apple did not 
intend to allow third-party developers to build native apps when iPhone was unveiled in 2007. 
Then in 2018, Apple released the SDK that allowed the development of native apps, thereby 
promoting an increasing number of developers to become complementors of the iPhone 
platform. Our understanding of the platform phenomenon can benefit from more longitudinal 
studies on platform dynamics (de Reuver et al., 2018). Unfortunately, due to the 
methodological difficulties of following a specific platform development from the beginning 
forward (Gawer & Cusumano, 2014), we have very limited knowledge and empirical evidence 
of how business ventures actually develop their platforms, especially in nascent industries 
(Dattée et al., 2018; de Reuver et al., 2018; Kyprianou, 2018; Nambisan, 2017; Nambisan, 
Lyytinen, Majchrzak & Song, 2017).  
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To investigate the emergence and development of the innovation platform, this study 
uses comprehensive evidence gathered from multiple sources (archival documents, interviews, 
observations and facilitate workshops) in a three-year study of the UK’s nascent tele-
rehabilitation through gaming (TRTG) industry. Our analysis is informed by a dynamic 
capabilities perspective. We consider this perspective appropriate because the concept of 
dynamic capabilities refers to a firm’s ability to identify business opportunities in a changing 
environment and then align its resources to pursue them successfully (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997; Zahra, Sapienza & Davidsson, 2006), which can be used to depict the platform 
development and the requirement of the platform firms to orchestrate all the different resources 
and activities at a large scale during the process.  
Although the existing discussions of dynamics capabilities mainly focus on resources 
within firms’ boundaries, more recent studies (Giudici, Reinmoeller & Ravasi, 2018; Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 2012; Zeng & Mackay, 2019) have indicated that platform firms 
may need a set of new capabilities in order to coordinate their resources and the activities of 
the platform firms and complementors. Therefore, by investigating platform development in a 
nascent industry through the analytical lens of dynamic capabilities, this paper focuses on the 
following two research questions: (1) What capabilities can enable business ventures to 
develop innovation platforms in nascent industries, and how? (2) How do business ventures 
deploy the desired capabilities for platform development?  
The paper makes two main contributions to the existing literature and academic debates. 
The first relates to the development of a holistic framework that identifies four capabilities for 
successful platform development. The framework extends received wisdom on previous 
studies by reaffirming the importance of innovation leverage and appropriation, advancing the 
less-researched role of market exploration and quality control, and more importantly, 
illustrating how these capabilities relate to each other to drive the platform development 
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process. By doing so, we provide a thick description and contextualized theoretical 
understanding of the phenomenon and the underlying dynamics. The second contribution is to 
illustrate how a business venture in a nascent industry can deploy the desired capabilities by 
altering its firm boundary and integrating selective roles in the industry. As a result, we 
interpret platform firms’ boundary decisions and dynamics as the need of these firms to deploy 
these capabilities when developing the platforms. Our results further encourage a fundamental 
rethinking of platform firms’ boundaries by showing that platform firms do not always shrink 
their firm boundaries inwards because of increased support from complementors. They 
sometimes expand their firm boundaries with the goal of deploying those capabilities in order 
to facilitate platform developments.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
A review of the platform research points to the existence of different literature streams. 
In this section, we first present an overview of the platform studies and highlight the knowledge 
gap, as it relates to the current study. Next, we introduce the dynamic capabilities perspective 
that we used as an analytical lens to examine how a business venture develops its platform. 
Platform Discussion in the Existing Literature 
Platforms have been the focus of a growing body of academic and practitioner-oriented 
work, due to the substantial and abnormal returns driven by the direct and indirect network 
externalities (Gawer, 2014). The discussions in this field have mainly centred on innovation 
platforms and transaction platforms (Cusumano et al., 2019). The former are also referred to 
as technology platforms (Kyprianou, 2018), industry platforms (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002) 
and software-based platforms (Tiwana et al., 2010), while the latter platforms are often referred 
to as matchmakers (Evans & Schmalensee, 2016), multi-sided platforms (Boudreau & Hagiu, 
2009), shared economy platforms (Constantiou, Marton & Tuunainen, 2017), and peer-to-peer 
marketplaces (Kyprianou, 2018). Similarly, both types of platforms rely on the number of 
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supply-side and demand-side participants to improve their transactional efficiency through 
direct and indirect network effects (Armstrong, 2006; Lee, Lee & Lee, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 
2006). Differently, innovation platforms focus on the purposefully designed technological 
foundation that can facilitate complementors with specialised expertise in developing 
complementary innovation outputs (Thomas, 2017; Ulrich, 1995)—with Intel and Apple as 
frequently named successful examples, while transaction platforms emphasise the network 
effect that comes into being between two groups of interdependent customers (e.g., buyers and 
sellers) in the multi-sided markets created by the platforms themselves (Boudreau & Hagiu, 
2009; Kyprianou, 2018)—with Airbnb and Uber as frequently named examples. The current 
paper focuses on the innovation platform.  
Given the potential of platforms for rapid and nonlinear growth (Cusumano et al., 2019), 
scholars are increasingly interested in platform related strategies—in particular for the 
emergence and persistence of competitive advantage—and focusing on those firm-related 
factors and actions that may influence success (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). Examples 
include entry timing (Suarez, Grodal & Gotsopoulos, 2015), the competition between emerging 
platforms and incumbents (Ansari, Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2016; Eisenmann, Parker & Van 
Alstyne, 2011), the coordination and competition between the platform firm and its 
complementors (Eaton et al., 2015; Svahn, Mathiassen & Lindgren, 2017; Zhu & Liu, 2018), 
the roles played by the installed base size (Shankar & Bayus, 2003) and the complementors 
(Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; Gupta, Jain & Sawhney, 1999; Ozalp, Cennamo & Gawer, 2018; 
Wareham, Fox & Cano Giner, 2014).  
While increasingly research on the platform phenomenon has been presented by 
successful platforms in established industries, much less work exists that illustrates the early 
stages of platform development especially in nascent industries (Dattée et al., 2018; de Reuver 
et al., 2018; Kyprianou, 2018; Nambisan, 2017; Nambisan et al., 2017). We thus argue that 
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many findings and insights from previous studies may not apply to platforms in the latter 
settings and for two main reasons. First, a functional platform relies on the platform firm, the 
complementors and their coordination (Jacobides et al., 2018; Tiwana et al., 2010). While one 
can identify the de facto structure of an established and successful platform ecosystem, it will 
still be difficult to obtain an ex ante understanding of a nascent one where the participants and 
their relationships are yet unclear. Second, it is vital to recognise that platforms and industries 
can evolve over time (de Reuver et al., 2018; Gawer, 2014). While an established platform and 
its ecosystem may be relatively stable, a nascent platform can experience constant and rapid 
change, as the platform firm and its complementors are exploring new value creation activities 
and finding and exercising new ways to coordinate with each other.  
As a result, the recent literature has started to shift its attention to study the early stages 
of platform dynamics through longitudinal studies. Eaton et al. (2015) explained platform 
development as a process through which distributed actors collectively tune the boundary 
resources, but focused on the boundary resources as the unit of analysis. Dattée et al. (2018) 
studied how the focal firms can lead others to collectively discover and then create a de novo 
ecosystem, but only give specific attention to the formation of new value propositions.  
Kyprianou (2018) illustrated the value creation process of new platforms by governing and 
conforming individuals’ behaviours, but derived these insights from the contexts of peer-to-
peer marketplaces. These related studies, therefore, are still insufficient to support a 
comprehensive understanding of how business ventures develop innovation platforms in 
nascent industries, leaving a gap that this study aims to fill.  
Dynamic Capabilities for Platform Development 
Firms with dynamic capabilities are able to integrate, build and reconfigure its resource 
base to address the changing business environment (Teece et al., 1997). Therefore, “almost by 
definition, the capabilities that platform leaders require are dynamic, in that designing, 
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introducing, and redesigning products and ecosystems are directed toward strategic change” 
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018: 1393). Examining the platform phenomenon using the lens of 
dynamic capabilities has the potential to produce important implications to both theory and 
practice. Although dynamic capabilities are usually discussed based on resources within a 
firm’s boundaries (Eisenhardt Kathleen & Martin Jeffrey, 2000; Pentland, Feldman, Becker & 
Liu, 2012; Teece, 2007, 2012), more recent studies have recognized the importance of dynamic 
capabilities to mobilize external resources in ongoing conceptual discussions of platform firms 
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 2012) as well as in empirical studies of transaction 
platforms (Zeng & Mackay, 2019) and venture associations (Giudici et al., 2018). Even though 
these studies offer little detailed information on the process of business ventures as they 
develop innovation platforms, their results all indicate that platform firms need a set of 
capabilities to align their internal and external resources. Such capabilities are particularly 
important for innovation platforms which rely on the platform firms and their complementors’ 
coordinated resources and activities.  
In the context of platform development, dynamic capabilities allow platform firms to 
sense opportunities (and threats), seize the opportunities, and reconfigure their existing 
business models and resource base (Teece, 2007, 2018a), which implicate a wide variety of 
capabilities and activities as pertaining to creating the core component, managing the 
complements, growing the market and capturing value from doing so. We argue that platform 
firms with these desired capabilities can enable appropriate business models and their related 
activities (Teece, 2007, 2010, 2018a), thereby facilitating platform development and 
addressing the challenges involved in the process. 
The existing literature has only addressed some of the capabilities and activities for 
platform development. For instance, researchers have long been examining the central role of 
platform firms to identify what innovation assets to be shared as the core component, and how 
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(Gawer & Cusumano, 2008; Iansiti & Levien, 2004). The pricing strategies for innovation 
outputs have also been well studied in order to understand how platform firms grow the market, 
profit from the innovation outputs and reward complementors (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; 
Hagiu, 2014).  However, we still have limited understanding of many other aspects of firms’ 
capabilities and activities in the platform development process (see future research directions 
highlighted in McIntyre & Srinivasan (2017), Nambisan et al. (2017), and Jacobides et al. 
(2018)). In particular, although being considered as a compelling rationale for successful 
platforms, network effects are not automatically generated without purposeful actions of the 
platform firms (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018). Therefore, more empirical evidence is needed to 
illustrate how firms can establish such network effects in the early stages of platform 
development. Moreover, platforms can introduce new innovation outputs, but they also bring 
in new uncertainties and risks due to the increased diversity of the complementors and their 
activities (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011). Given its responsibility to maintain the continued 
relevance and market value of the innovation outputs, a platform firm needs to regulate its 
complementors (Jacobides et al., 2018; Wareham et al., 2014) and control the quality of 
innovation outputs (McIntyre, 2011; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017), which are still 
inadequately discussed in the literature.  
Another area that is poorly understood and theorized is how platforms firms coordinate 
the complementors and other stakeholders in the ecosystem, integrate all the related activities, 
and transform their business models and wider resource base accordingly (also referred to 
“dynamic integrative capabilities” by Helfat & Raubitschek (2018)). Furthermore, some 
platform related activities may serve multiple purposes and involve various platform 
participants.  For instance, the use of pricing strategies can stimulate market growth, determine 
profit from innovation outputs, and provide incentives for complementors to participate in the 
ecosystem (Hagiu, 2014); the development of boundary resources can facilitate the use of the 
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core component for complements and secure the control of the core component (Eaton et al., 
2015). Therefore, it is vital for a platform firm to provide necessary alignment and adjustment 
throughout the ecosystem, especially when the platform is constantly evolving at its early 
stages, which can also benefit from an improved understanding of the platform development 
process.  
Informed by these knowledge gaps and encouraged by recent calls to develop and test 
theories pertaining to platform development (Jacobides et al., 2018; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 
2017; Nambisan et al., 2017), we adopt the dynamic capabilities perspective to examine how a 
platform firm purposely deploy capabilities in order to facilitate platform development and 
address the key challenges in the process.  
RESEARCH METHOD 
Setting the Scene: Tele-rehabilitation through Gaming in the UK 
The setting for this study is the nascent TRTG industry in the UK.  TRTG is one form of 
tele-rehabilitation that resides in the broader area of assisted living technologies and services 
(ALTS). Like other nascent industries and markets1, TRTG is driven by innovative products 
and services that defy the existing categories (Zuzul & Tripsas, 2020); i.e., it allows patients to 
rehabilitate while playing video games.  
The TRTG industry was enabled by the combinational advancement in rehabilitation 
therapy knowledge and video game technologies. Many stroke survivors require long-term 
clinical treatment to prevent their further deterioration and let them remain as independent as 
possible for the best possible quality of life. This process is causing financial difficulties in the 
UK and many other countries due to their growing aging populations. TRTG promises to offer 
improved clinical and financial results compared with traditional approaches. Because of the 
broad range of potential beneficiaries involved—including the patients, their families and 
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friends, healthcare providers, financing bodies, and society at large—this nascent industry has 
generated high hopes for researchers, industry practitioners, investors, and the public sector.  
Our research was principally inductive and we collected a full range of evidence within 
this context (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003). The industry resides within a mixed economy of 
care that consists of public sector and business players from different private sectors; this 
context generated an uncertainty about the ownership, responsibilities, and direction of 
businesses that made the industry particularly fragmented. An expert invited to our facilitated 
workshops explained:  
“The enormous complexity and practical difficulties involved necessitates a co-construction 
approach by creating the context in which different stakeholders can explore, discuss and make 
sense of the complex relationships and conflicting demands, and negotiate and co-develop 
consensus and plausible and workable solutions. […] organizations in this fragmented 
marketplace need to move away from providing closed platforms and integrated solutions [e.g., 
one product package with a set of generic functions developed by a single firm]. This 
fragmentation stifles innovation, limits inter-operability and fails to achieve the potential 
benefits of network externalities. It also leads to limited joining up between the commercial 
and public sector to personalize the client, patient, and customer experience”. (Notes taken 
during the facilitated workshop)  
Indeed, the successful provision of TRTG products has been more likely to rely on the 
collaboration of different businesses that share and reuse innovation assets. This scenario has 
offered opportunities for the development of new innovation platforms, which allowed us to 
investigate the key challenges of this nascent industry and understand how these are being 
addressed during the platform development process. 
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Data Collection 
Data was collected from mixed sources between 2011 and 2014 using different 
methods. In addition to the comprehensive evidence gathered from various industry 
stakeholders, the research paid particular attention to one firm, because it was one of the few 
leading players that possessed the key mechanisms to embed clinically approved therapy 
knowledge in video games.  
To develop an in-depth understanding of the UK’s TRTG industry, we conducted 17 
semi-structured expert interviews with knowledgeable stakeholders including two TRTG 
providers and two tele-rehabilitation providers. These interviewees were selected using the 
purposive snowballing technique (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Because TRTG is a subfield of 
ALTS, we also interviewed the senior executives at 11 UK ALTS providers to examine the 
similarities and differences with the TRTG industry. Each interview lasted between one and 
two hours. Notes were taken during the interviews and later expanded for more detail. The 
interviews were deliberately not recorded to encourage uninhibited discussion. The semi-
structured nature of the interviews also left room for any emerging issues and personal 
interaction beyond the designated topics and questions (Yin, 2003). This choice was intended 
to enable a full exploration of the TRTG industry, including its structure, key business players, 
business models2, and key challenges.  
Throughout this project, we also collaborated with three UK research teams that were 
studying the ALTS industry with specific focuses on macroeconomic analysis, user attitudes 
and user engagement. Through shared data (research notes, case studies, and project reports), 
monthly meetings, and regular personal interactions and conversations, we also accessed their 
findings and insights. These mixed data sources enabled a useful triangulation of information 
(Yin, 2003). We eventually produced a total of 321 pages of documentation that afforded us a 
rich and multifaceted understanding of the TRTG industry.  
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In parallel to collecting data about the UK’s TRTG industry, we followed one UK TRTG 
provider (code-name TRTG-Provider for confidentiality reasons) for three years with the main 
objective being to study its business development, especially its strategic decisions and key 
activities during that process. This focus on a single TRTG provider enables us to establish a 
continuing and fruitful relationship and address the research problem in considerable depth 
(Crouch & McKenzie, 2006).  
TRTG-Provider, founded in 2010, was among the few key players in the UK that was 
leading this nascent industry. We undertook two field observations of the company, one at the 
beginning of the first year of our project and one in the second year.3 After the first field 
observation, we maintained regular contact with the firm at least once each month to understand 
its business development. We collected data using emails, Skype meetings, and informal talks, 
and by attending its business meetings; i.e., we would ask for information recounting what had 
happened since our last conversation. Some of these conversations were brief (when no major 
business changes had taken place), but we often needed to arrange additional conversations if 
the business had experienced major changes in its direction and/or activities. To capture as 
much verbatim information as possible, notes were taken during these observations and 
conversations, and we later expanded them for greater detail. During the second year of this 
project, we conducted a formal in-depth interview with the founder of TRTG-Provider to 
verify, comment on, and discuss our initial findings. We also gathered relevant information 
about the business and the entrepreneur before this project. These collected data enable us to 
produce an 80-page document describing the TRTG-Provider’s business and its development 
over time. 
We also organised two facilitated workshops (one halfway through the project and the 
other at the end) with the interviewees, members of three collaborative research teams, and 
other interested parties. In these, we presented and discussed our preliminary findings, 
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validated our data, identified any biases, and obtained additional feedbacks (Johnston, Leach 
& Liu, 1999). Notes were taken by two researchers and included in the above two noted 
documents to update main findings accordingly. Archival files saved in the project’s shared 
Dropbox were also helpful for understanding the research context, and supporting the final 
interpretation of the collected data.  
Data Analysis 
All the collected data were reviewed, discussed, and analysed by two researchers 
supervised by the project principal investigator. For simplicity, we present the data analysis 
here in four stages, although multiple iterations actually occurred.  
Stage one: understanding the TRTG industry. For a broad understanding of the 
industry, we engaged in the open coding of all notes collected from the interviews conducted 
with UK TRTG stakeholders and ALTS providers, three collaborative research teams, and two 
workshops (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Using the first interview as a starting point, we 
searched for text segments that referred to the industry’s key business players and their business 
models. An analytic induction approach was subsequently adopted. We analysed each 
subsequent interview and input from the collaborative teams and workshops for evidence that 
added, supported, amended, or contradicted the prior findings, and we then iteratively modified 
them (Bansal & Roth, 2000). The data coding was first undertaken by two researchers 
independently and then compared and discussed to ensure inter-coder reliability and 
agreement. When conflicting or inconsistent views emerged, we discussed them within the 
project team and consulted the relevant interviewees before making a final judgment. Because 
the resulting context represented an aggregate view of the key industry stakeholders, it was 
likely to guide and shape the development of the TRTG industry and its players during the 
study. It served the purpose of setting a clear and reliable research context, although it might 
not represent the industry’s ultimate profile, as that industry evolves and matures.  
PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT                                                                                          15 
©Shi, Li & Chumnumpan, 2020 
 
By conducting multiple rounds of reading and discussions, we also searched the notes 
for text segments that referred to the key challenges of TRTG development and 
commercialisation. We then gradually combined similar codes into first-order categories. In a 
further round of coding, we combined those first-order categories into fewer, broader, and 
theoretically relevant second-order themes. Eventually, we identified four key challenges as 
the aggregated dimensions of this nascent industry that required specific attention from the 
TRTG providers. 
Stage two: tracing the business development of TRTG-Provider. We continued our 
open coding activity by placing a specific focus on the data collected from TRTG-Provider. 
Following the observation notes taken during the first field visit, we recorded any key 
changes—including strategic decisions and key activities—in chronological order, based on 
the data collected thereafter through conversations and a second field visit. Eventually, we 
formed an interpretation of TRTG-Provider’s business development process, which we then 
discussed within the project team to produce a full and complete narrative of its key activities. 
Any discrepancies were resolved through discussions and occasional data recoding. The 
interview with the entrepreneur was used to verify our initial findings and obtain additional 
information complementing TRTG-Provider’s development process—for instance, any 
relevant information about the firm and the entrepreneur prior to this project—and then discuss 
emerging insights. The two facilitated workshops thereby served a purpose similar to that of 
the interview with the entrepreneur.  
Stage three: identifying capabilities for platform development. We moved on to axial 
coding to uncover the relationships between our observations (Corbin & Strauss, 2008). First, 
we associated the key challenges (identified in Stage One) with the key activities (observed in 
Stage Two); i.e., we examined how TRTG-Provider had responded through its activities to the 
four key challenges identified in this nascent industry. This analysis enabled the grouping of 
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TRTG-Provider’s observed activities into four categories for the four key challenges, and the 
derivation of four capabilities. In brief, these capabilities had enabled TRTG-Provider to 
deploy key activities appropriate to facilitate platform development and address the key 
challenges in the process. It is worth noting that each activity could be associated with different 
key challenges; for instance, product module design could be used to produce economies of 
scope for innovation outputs, and also as a quality control mechanism to manage quality of 
innovation outputs. This data reduction enables us to focus precisely on our topic of interest 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994). We present the resulting data structure in Figure 1.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Stage four: building a holistic framework for platform development. We organized 
our emerging interpretations into a processual illustration and a holistic framework that account 
for the four identified capabilities, the observed activities enabled by the capabilities to address 
the key challenges, and how this process enables business ventures to develop innovation 
platforms. We tested alternative conceptual frameworks and assembled our interpretations into 
an overarching framework that fit the gathered evidence (Locke, 2001). The findings were 
reviewed for contradictions and generation of new insights related to gathered literature 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). To increase the reliability of our overall interpretation, provisional 
interpretations offered at various stages of the analysis were submitted to informants for 
feedback. Combining the framework, the industry setting and the business development of 
TRTG-Provider also allowed us to reveal and discuss how the business venture had deployed 
the required capabilities in its platform development. 
OVERVIEW OF THE INDUSTRY AND THE CASE FIRM 
Before presenting our findings, we briefly describe the studied industry and case firm 
here. Figure 2 illustrates the five key business players (i.e., therapy knowledge providers, 
PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT                                                                                          17 
©Shi, Li & Chumnumpan, 2020 
 
middleware designers, game studios, hardware providers, and publishers) in the TRTG 
industry, their roles, and the key information pertaining to their business models. Note that the 
business players are specifically defined based on their roles in the TRTG industry, therefore, 
a single firm can act as multiple business players by taking on different roles. More specifically, 
our findings suggest that therapy knowledge providers developed the clinically approved 
therapy knowledge that could be coded into game engines for TRTG game development, 
middleware designers supplied game studios with game engines for game development, 
hardware providers developed consoles to run the TRTG games, and publishers sought market 
potential and commissioned game studios to produce TRTG games best suited to their market 
demand.  
TRTG publishers, in particular, required understanding of post-stroke rehabilitation and 
the healthcare market, including its regulations pertaining to clinical governance, innovation 
governance, and communication protocols. To successfully market these products, TRTG 
publishers needed to understand not only the patients but also healthcare providers and 
financing bodies—including the UK’s National Health Service (NHS)—who had their own 
related considerations and agendas. One interviewee from the NHS commented on the barriers 
to the adoption of such products: 
“In a climate where reorganizations are regularly taking place in the NHS, it can be hard for 
staff to feel in control and understand the impact of changes on them. With so much effort 
placed in the reorganization of the NHS in recent years, the appetite to adopt new technology 
and change the way they work has diminished. Practically driving a project within the NHS is 
challenging when staff are moving from post to post, so new relationships need to be 
established all the time.” (Interview notes: Interviewee from the NHS – Innovation Hub) 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
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TRTG-Provider was founded in 2010 as a university spinoff by a university scholar in 
partnership with the university and an NHS Hospital Foundation Trust. It was rooted in many 
years of research on a mechanism that could transfer clinically approved therapy knowledge 
into action video games for tele-rehabilitation. Operating as a publisher, it also included therapy 
knowledge as part of its intellectual property. In other words, the firm took on the additional 
role of a therapy knowledge provider. The entrepreneur explained that mixed role as follows: 
“[TRTG-Provider] has medical expertise and has the ability to call the experts to actually 
devise the programme which can go to the games and then certify it based on the experts' 
names.” (Interview notes: Founder of TRTG-Provider)  
TRTG-Provider’s Executive Board included the entrepreneur and representatives of 
other funding organisations. After setting up TRTG-Provider as a publisher, the entrepreneur 
planned to expand the firm to include middleware and game development activities to speed 
up product development. However, that proposition was rejected by other board members and 
the entrepreneur then founded two separate firms with another business partner. Due to our 
close relationship with TRTG-Provider, we were able to obtain a precise understanding of the 
two affiliated firms during our data collection process. TRTG-Provider later started to build 
links with hardware providers with the intention of developing tailored consoles and devices 
for TRTG purposes. However, the need for this collaboration was not urgent, as the existing 
consoles and motion sensing technologies were sufficient enough then to support the initial 
TRTG games. Thus, by the end of this study, there was still only limited direct involvement of 
hardware providers in the development process. Given the generic nature (Jacobides et al., 
2018) of the hardware in this industry, the hardware developers were excluded from this 
particular platform ecosystem in our discussions.  
To summarize, the core component of our studied innovation platform is the clinically 
approved therapy knowledge developed by TRTG-Provider (i.e., the platform firm). Based on 
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the core component, TRTG-Provider also developed the game engine and the rules of the game 
(i.e., boundary resources) to attract other game studios (i.e., complementors) to participate in 
the ecosystem and develop more TRTG games (i.e., complements) for the market.  
MAIN FINDINGS 
By analysing the stakeholder viewpoints and the findings from TRTG-Provider, 
respectively, we identified four key challenges for this nascent industry (see Table 1) and the 
key activities enacted by TRTG-Provider related to them (see Table 2). The integration of the 
above findings allow us to derive four capabilities4 deployed by TRTG-Provider to address the 
key challenges involved in developing its platform (see Figure 1):  
• Market exploration refers to the ability to explore different market routes to expand the 
market demand for the innovation outputs. Instead of improving only existing marketing 
activities and strategies, market exploration also seeks new market routes (Kyriakopoulos 
& Moorman, 2004), as these can be particularly important for a business in its early stages 
of development. Possessing this proposed capability allows a platform firm to develop 
appropriate business models and undertake a series of activities to communicate clearly 
with the market and identify and develop new segments, channels, and promotions.  
• Appropriation refers to the ability to profit from innovation outputs and reward 
complementors accordingly. Appropriation can be a key organizational capability (Reitzig 
& Puranam, 2009). In platform ecosystems, a lack of appropriation mechanisms causes 
concern for complementors or even legal implications (Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Ozcan 
& Santos, 2015). Possessing the proposed capability allows a platform firm to develop 
appropriate business models and undertake a series of activities to develop and protect its 
revenue streams and thereby reward complementors relative to their contributions.  
• Innovation leverage refers to the ability to identify and develop the innovation assets (i.e., 
the core component) to be shared by complementors for more innovation outputs. In a 
platform ecosystem, utilizing a common set of innovation assets can minimize development 
redundancies, reduce development costs and increase flexibility in end configurations 
(Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011; Schilling, 2000). Possessing this proposed capability allows 
a platform firm to develop appropriate business models and undertake a series of activities 
to identify what innovation assets to be shared with the complementors, and how.  
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• Quality control refers to the ability to manage the quality of innovation outputs, including 
those of the complementors. Possessing this proposed capability allows a platform firm to 
develop appropriate business models and undertake a series of activities to set and adjust 
the quality standard, monitor the quality of innovation outputs relative to the standard, and 
then support complementors to meet the standard during the process.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------  
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
We present more detail on these challenges, capabilities, and activities below along with 
the business and platform development of TRTG-Provider (see a summary in Table 3). These 
challenges became prominent for TRTG-Provider at different phases of its business 
development, and we explain the activities that were enabled by TRTG-Provider’s capabilities 
to address the challenges in its platform development process.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Phase I: Research (pre-business)  
The entrepreneur was a university academic who had many years of research experience 
in therapy development and wanted to collaborate with game developers to explore the benefits 
of using video games for upper limb rehabilitation. After a few attempts the entrepreneur 
realised that the existing game industry was neither interested in nor capable of developing 
TRTG games, because it did not have the required resources and considered the development 
and commercialisation of health-related products too risky. Therefore, the entrepreneur decided 
to start a business to lead and develop this nascent industry further.  
By then, the entrepreneur was mainly focussing on the development of therapy 
knowledge for research purposes. Hence, the entrepreneur was not aware of the potential 
challenges in this industry, and further, had not conducted or planned any business activities to 
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respond to those unknown challenges. Nevertheless, we considered this phase vital for the case 
firm and for our study, because the therapy knowledge in the development would later become 
the key intellectual property of the firm and indeed the core component of its platform.  
Phase II: Business Formation 
A first major grant (£250K) was secured to develop an initial TRTG game (based on PC 
and existing motion sensing technologies). After the grant was awarded, the entrepreneur 
managed to found a spinoff firm (i.e., TRTG-Provider) in partnership with the university and 
a NHS Hospital Foundation Trust. An internal team of experts in action games at the university 
was also hired to help develop the game. Meanwhile, the entrepreneur noted that no existing 
firm had the channels or the knowledge of the related regulations to market the products. 
Therefore, TRTG-Provider was set up originally to be a TRTG publisher and thereby explore 
the different routes to the market.  
Emerging key challenges. Like most other businesses, once product development 
reaches a substantial stage, market exploration and monetization are vital for these firms. Two 
challenges became prominent for TRTG-Provider in this phase. One pertained to the market 
demand for innovation outputs; the other challenge pertained to the appropriation mechanisms 
that were best suited to profit from the innovation outputs.  
TRTG-Provider and many other industry stakeholders reported that the market had 
actually been developing much more slowly than had previously been expected. Our data 
revealed three main reasons for this slow market growth. First, the potential users of TRTG 
products were often aging people unfamiliar with (or even scared of) advanced technologies. 
They had never played video games in their entire lives (see Quote-1.1.1&2 in Table 1), so 
they were little motivated to adopt the products. Second, TRTG had been struggling to increase 
its product awareness (see Quote-1.2.1&2 in Table 1). Many users, especially the aging ones, 
could not be easily reached via the usual marketing channels, including the Internet; instead, 
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they often relied on information sourced from healthcare providers (e.g., their doctors and 
caregivers). More concrete evidence was also needed to support the effectiveness and economic 
value of TRTG and convince both users and healthcare providers; this focus required more 
clinical trials and cost-effectiveness analyses. Third, TRTG products had to face strict 
regulatory barriers to be able to enter the regulated medical device market (see Quote-
1.3.1&2&3&4 in Table 1). That issue is particularly important for the UK market, because its 
healthcare is primarily provided by the public sector (i.e., the NHS).  
In addition, healthcare products and services in the UK are largely financed by the public 
sector (i.e., the NHS), so end users (i.e., the patients) were mostly not individuals who paid for 
such products and services (see Quote-2.1.1&2&3 in Table 1). Therefore, to successfully profit 
from their products, the TRTG providers had to either reach the end users indirectly (e.g., by 
entering the regulated market, working with insurers, and targeting the users’ family and 
friends) or convince the users to pay (e.g., through the superior performance of their products 
and more dedicated marketing campaigns). These difficulties linked to monetization were 
made worse by the complex nature of the UK healthcare system. Its policies and procedures 
were different than those found in other countries and also differed between regions and local 
authorities (see Quote-2.2.1&2 in Table 1).  
Deployed capabilities & enabled activities. Responding to the first challenge, TRTG-
Provider started to deploy the capability of market exploration, which could enable the 
business models and activities that were appropriate to increase market demand for its 
innovation outputs. Efforts during this period focused on the evaluation of different market 
routes, such as the self-purchase market, the NHS, private hospitals and insurers using various 
pricing strategies (e.g., the initial offer of a lower price to attract more self-purchase users; also 
see Quote-1.a in Table 2) to stimulate market adoption. Meanwhile, TRTG-Provider also 
conducted more clinical trials to convince patients, healthcare providers, and financing bodies 
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of the efficacy of their products and thus become early adopters and influence others to follow 
suit (i.e., the role of early adopters in Table 2; also see Quote-1.b in Table 2). 
Responding to the second challenge, TRTG-Provider started to deploy the capability of 
appropriation to develop business models and activities appropriate to provide mechanisms 
suited to ensure they would profit from their innovation outputs. In particular, TRTG publishers 
played a key role in the industry for monetizing from innovation outputs (see Table 2), which 
required them to develop revenue streams suited to profit from the explored market (i.e., 
through continuous negotiation with the stakeholders in that market; also see “Financial 
aspects” in Figure 2 for the different publisher revenue models) and protect those revenue 
streams from competitors. As a result, TRTG-Provider decided to enter the self-purchase 
market as a starting point and then gradually move to the regulated market after obtaining 
regulatory approval, and during the process tried to apply patents to protect its core intellectual 
properties; that is, the therapy knowledge (see Quote-2.a in Table 2).  
Summary of the business and its platform development. TRTG-Provider acted as a 
publisher and therapy knowledge provider at the same time; that is, it evaluated and explored 
different routes to the market, and it held the developed therapy knowledge. A team of video 
game experts was contracted to work with TRTG-Provider to develop the TRTG games. In 
terms of platform development, although the core component (i.e., therapy knowledge) had 
been developed, TRTG-Provider did not know how to attract complementors (i.e., game 
studios) to develop complements based on the core component.  
Phase III: Platform Emergence 
Another £2.1m grant was secured to develop the entire package of TRTG and study the 
possible business models for commercialising such a product. TRTG-Provider needed faster 
development of TRTG games to showcase the benefits of the product (medical performance 
and the fun experience of the process) to its stakeholders, conduct clinical trials, and explore 
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the market. Therefore, specialised game developers were needed. However, there were no 
game studios that could develop such games and no game engines to assist the game studios in 
that development. Therefore, the entrepreneur set up a middleware designer firm and a game 
studio to support TRTG-Provider’s business.  
Emerging key challenges. While the key challenges in the previous phase remained 
prominent, another also appeared—the economies of scope for innovation outputs; that is, how 
to develop more TRTG games at a limited cost. 
Like other medical devices and video games, TRTG products involve high product 
development and commercialisation costs. In an emerging industry like TRTG, it was vital, 
although costly, to obtain better understanding of the potential users and the market from the 
early stage of development forward (see Quote-3.1.1 in Table 1). However, as many of the 
existing business players in the TRTG industry were SMEs, product development was largely 
constrained by the limited funding these players could access (see Quote-3.1.2 in Table 1). 
Further still, TRTG requires variously themed games to satisfy different patients’ preferences 
and make the rehabilitation process more fun (or less tedious). It should be noted as well that 
this element of fun is the key difference between TRTG and conventional tele-rehabilitation 
(see Quote-3.2.1&2 in Table 1). Therefore, TRTG providers were seeking a solution that would 
enable them to develop more TRTG games at a limited cost (i.e., economies of scope) and 
enrich the product family while providing patients with more games from which to choose.  
Deployed capabilities & enabled activities. To respond to this challenge, the business 
ventures in this nascent industry needed the capability of innovation leverage to be able to 
develop business models and activities appropriate to provide the economies of scope needed 
for innovation outputs. TRTG-Provider adopted product modular design and multisided market 
creation (see Table 2). The former means that a core component—in this case, clinically 
approved therapy knowledge developed through continuous R&D activities—can be identified 
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and reused to develop more innovation outputs. By coding the therapy knowledge into a game 
engine through the affiliated middleware designer firm, TRTG-Provider could reuse it for 
efficiency and cost reduction. Later in Phase IV, other game studios could do the same and 
lower their entry level and development costs (see Quote-3.a&b in Table 2). The latter means 
that a platform firm can create and maintain a multisided market to facilitate the transactions 
between its users and complementors. In our case, TRTG-Provider shared its market routes and 
enabled users to access more TRTG games and its affiliated game studio (and other game 
studios later on in Phase IV) to reach more users. This process gave the game studios additional 
motivation to develop TRTG games for the platform.  
TRTG-Provider continued to deploy the capability of market exploration, which 
enables business models and additional activities appropriate for increasing market demand for 
its innovation outputs further. In particular, TRTG-Provider could receive prototype games 
from its affiliated game studio and showcase them to the market to drive engagement (i.e., the 
exemplar role of platform firm in Table 2). The increasing numbers of TRTG games available 
to users also gave them more choices and made the rehabilitation process more fun, thereby 
attracting more users into adopting their products (i.e., multisided market creation in Table 2). 
Summary of the business and its platform development. TRTG-Provider continued 
acting as publisher and therapy knowledge provider simultaneously; i.e., exploring the routes 
to the market and developing therapy knowledge for TRTG development. It also worked 
closely with its affiliated game studio and middleware designer firm to develop the game 
engine and prototype games. However, it had very limited collaboration with other firms. 
The core component (i.e., therapy knowledge) and the game engine (i.e., boundary 
resources) that allowed the game studio (i.e., complementors) to access the core component 
were both developed. The platform started to emerge, but it only worked as an internal platform 
(Thomas, Autio & Gann, 2014) in this phase; that is, therapy knowledge was coded into the 
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game engine, but it could only be reused by the affiliated game studio as commissioned by 
TRTG-Provider.  
Phase IV: Platform Development 
The business continued to move forward with ever increasing endorsements from 
different stakeholders in the industry. TRTG-Provider decided to enter the self-purchased 
market before moving to the regulated market. To explore and penetrate that market, more 
TRTG games of good quality were needed, but they could not be provided by TRTG-Provider 
and its affiliated firms alone. However, other game studios hesitated to join, due to their lack 
of skills to develop such games and concerns about profitability. Therefore, the entrepreneur 
decided to share necessary innovation assets with other game studios to develop more TRTG 
games and explore the market.  
Emerging key challenges. While the key challenges in previous phase remained 
prominent, new ones also started to emerge. One pertained to the quality control mechanisms 
that were suited to manage the quality of innovation outputs; the other pertained to the 
appropriation mechanisms that were suited to rewarding complementors, in particular.  
As medical devices, TRTG products had to meet a higher standard than required for 
normal games before a significant proportion of the population would take responsibility for 
their own health and care needs and pay for these products. If they were less effective than 
required, they could attract stigma and shift extra work onto the users and their caregivers. 
Therefore, the quality issue in TRTG—and, more broadly, in ALTS—was emphasised by 
various stakeholders during our research. However, different from its affiliated game studio 
that could receive direct attention and support from TRTG-Provider, other game developers 
lacked the essential knowledge and skills to develop TRTG games well suited for the desired 
rehabilitation purposes (see Quote-4.1.1&2&3&4 in Table 1). Moreover, firms from the video 
game industry, including the game studios, had additional concerns regarding quality control, 
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due to that industry’s history5 and its established business models (see Quote-4.2.1 in Table 1). 
More specifically, game studios relied heavily (and usually comfortably) on the publisher 
model, wherein publishers were responsible for financing the game studios’ development, 
manufacturing, and marketing activities. In other words, the publishers were taking more 
financial risks, while the game studios lacked the business model and incentives to develop 
qualified games on their own. Therefore, the game studios did not show complete confidence 
about entering the TRTG industry due to the lack of mechanisms well suited to help them 
develop good quality TRTG games and also protect them from the losses linked to the 
development of poor quality ones, which could lead to a poor user experience of the TRTG 
products overall (see Quote-4.2.2 in Table 1).  
In terms of the challenge of the appropriation mechanisms to reward complementors, 
our findings indicate a need for the development of a more transparent mechanism better suited 
to facilitate the flow of finance, so that TRTG providers can attract and maintain more firms 
(e.g., game studios) for the development process (see Quote-2.3.1&2 in Table 1). In the 
previous phase, TRTG-Provider did not consider the issue important, because its collaborative 
game studio and middleware designer firm were both owned by the same entrepreneur. It did 
not have much concern about profit distribution between the three firms.  
Deployed capabilities & enabled activities. Responding to the first challenge, TRTG-
Provider started to deploy the capability of quality control to develop business models and 
activities appropriate for providing mechanisms well suited to meet the quality standards of 
TRTG games. To achieve this desired quality control mechanism, TRTG-Provider managed to 
place triple insurance on the quality of innovation outputs by playing different roles in the 
industry and create more confidence in the game studios to collaborate. First, as a publisher, 
TRTG-Provider could audit TRTG games and ensure that only qualified ones were released to 
the market (i.e., right to audit in Table 2). Second, through the entrepreneur’s middleware 
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designer firm, TRTG-Provider’s therapy knowledge was coded into the game engine to 
maintain the TRTG games’ required clinical value (i.e., product modular design in Table 2). 
In other words, the basic medical performance of the games could be guaranteed if the game 
studios developed them based on the game engine. Finally, by showcasing the TRTG games 
developed by the entrepreneur’s game studio, TRTG-Provider could then establish quality 
standards for other game studios to follow (i.e., exemplar role of platform firm in Table 2). 
Based on the above activities, TRTG-Provider was able to prescribe a quality standard that 
could satisfy the high requirements of the market and, at the same time, be easily achieved by 
the game studios (see Quote-4.a&b in Table 2).  
Responding to the second challenge, TRTG-Provider continued to deploy the capability 
of appropriation to develop business models and activities appropriate for providing the 
mechanisms well suited to ensure they could reward complementors. Our findings indicate that 
the TRTG industry had been forming a set of agreed-upon revenue models between different 
business players to ensure that all their contributions could be properly rewarded; i.e., 
rewarding complementors in Table 2. For instance, TRTG publishers needed to agree on the 
appropriate revenue models with the game studios—also see the “Financial aspects” of game 
studios in Figure 2—through continuous negotiation. During the period of this study, new 
revenue models were still being formed by TRTG-Provider to profit from the market and also 
facilitate the financial relationship with other industry stakeholders. The TRTG-Provider 
entrepreneur commented on the firm’s revenue models and explained the situation when 
negotiating a deal with a major medical product distributor in the UK (see Quote-2.b in Table 
2).  
Summary of business and its platform development. TRTG-Provider and its affiliated 
game studio and middleware designer firm worked in a similar pattern to that of the previous 
phase, but with the additional sharing of its therapy knowledge with external game studios 
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through the game engine. Due to the inclusion of other game studios, TRTG-Provider had to 
introduce new activities that ensured the quality of complements and reward complementors 
for their contributions.  
By sharing the core component with other game studios, the platform evolved from an 
internal platform to one that can receive complementary innovation outputs from external game 
studios. Through the game engine and by accepting the rules of the game, including the quality 
standard and agreed-upon revenue models set by TRTG-Provider (i.e., boundary resources), 
other game studios (i.e., complementors) were then able to access the therapy knowledge (i.e., 
core component) and develop TRTG games for the platform’s customers.  
A Holistic Framework for Platform Development 
Our findings show that TRTG-Provider was able to address the key challenges and 
facilitate the platform development through its capabilities and enabled activities. Such 
capabilities, however, were quite obscure in other TRTG firms. For instance, the publishers 
and game studios from the video game industry had little therapy and the market knowledge to 
ensure product quality and profit from their innovation outputs. One main competitor of TRTG-
Provider (i.e., a Spanish TRTG provider) had product development knowledge, but failed to 
identify the appropriate mechanisms needed to share its therapy knowledge with other game 
studios for platform development. Before discussing the implications of our findings, let us 
recapitulate TRTG-Provider’s platform development process, to illustrate which, we developed 
a framework as shown in Figure 3.  
--------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------------------------- 
Firms can deploy the desired capabilities at different times and even before platform 
emergence. For instance, the capabilities of market exploration and appropriation started to be 
deployed by TRTG-Provider before the other two capabilities in Phase 2: business formation 
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(also see Table 3 and in Figure 3). The two capabilities together allowed TRTG-Provider to 
explore routes to the market, therefore, fuelled the development of the business at its very early 
stage. However, innovation leverage is usually the starting point for platform emergence. A 
platform can only be functional once a firm has identified and developed the innovation assets 
(i.e., core component) that can be reused to produce more innovation outputs; i.e., when the 
economies of scope for the innovation outputs are actually achieved. For TRTG-Provider, its 
platform only started to emerge (also see Phase 3: platform emergence as in Table 3 and in 
Figure 3) when it coded its therapy knowledge into a game engine (through its affiliated 
middleware designer firm) that could then be reused for game development.  
Once deployed, a platform continues to attract users and complementors due to the 
platform firm’s capabilities of innovation leverage and market exploration—the former leads 
to the generation of more innovation outputs, and the latter results in more market demand for 
those outputs. These economies of scope and market demand can stimulate each other. In the 
TRTG industry, as more game studios joined, the economies of scope brought by innovation 
leverage indicated a capacity for more TRTG games, hence requiring greater market demand 
to accommodate the increased innovation outputs. At the same time, the increased market 
demand indicated greater demand diversity, hence requiring more games to be produced.  
Finally, the fully deployed capabilities of quality control and appropriation can enable 
the corresponding mechanisms for the innovation outputs, which then constrain the above 
economies of scope and the market demand (also see Phase 4: platform development as in 
Table 3 and in Figure 3). An effective quality control mechanism can help foster innovation 
outputs of higher quality, and hence drive innovation leverage and market exploration by 
instilling confidence in complementors and in the market. In the case of TRTG’s products, 
meeting the required quality standards (i.e., medical performance) was also a prerequisite to 
enter the regulated market. To achieve the optimal quality control mechanism, TRTG-Provider 
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decided to focus on the medical aspects of quality through triple-quality insurance (i.e., product 
modular design, right to audit, and exemplar role of platform firm), and thus left the non-
medical aspects to the expertise of the game studios. An effective appropriability mechanism 
that generates profits and rewards complementors equitably can attract and motivate more 
complementors, thereby facilitating more innovation outputs. As indicated in our findings, 
TRTG-Provider noted the different characteristics of the market routes and was developing its 
revenue models and pricing strategies accordingly. At the same time, it was sharing its market 
routes to enable its complementors to profit from their own contributions. 
DISCUSSION  
In this paper, we have illustrated the platform development of a business venture in a 
nascent industry in a way that differs from the most commonly studied platform phenomenon 
that use snapshots of successful platforms in established industries. By drawing on the case of 
TRTG, this paper uncovers the process of platform development in this industry, and explores 
a set of issues that both challenges and extends the way we think about the platform 
phenomenon. In this section, we answer the research questions and discuss the implications of 
our findings. First, we focus on the identified capabilities and process for developing 
innovation platforms. Then we discuss how a business venture can deploy the capabilities by 
altering its firm boundaries. 
Capabilities and Process for Developing Innovation Platforms 
Our findings and our developed framework (see Figure 3) illustrate platform 
development based on the four capabilities of platform firms: innovation leverage, market 
exploration, quality control, and appropriation. Although these capabilities have been 
discussed to different extents in the platform literature, our unique dataset and related results 
allowed us to illustrate how the capabilities together drive the platform development. To 
highlight the novelty of our findings, we show how our observations extend the existing 
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frameworks for platform development, and discuss the new evidence and insights, as they relate 
to the two less understood capabilities of the four, namely, quality control and appropriation.   
Extending the frameworks of platform development process. The platform 
discussions thus far (see the reviews of Gawer (2014), Thomas et al. (2014), McIntyre & 
Srinivasan (2017), and de Reuver et al. (2018)) were primarily based on successful de facto 
platforms, and most studies adopted a focused view to examine the selected factors and phases 
of the platform development process. In addition, these papers were silent on how these 
interpretations can be transcribed to platform firms’ capabilities. For the process of platform 
development, for instance, the framework of Dhanaraj & Parkhe (2006) focused on knowledge 
mobility, network stability, innovation appropriability and their causal relationships and the 
innovation outputs. Nambisan & Sawhney (2011) instead conceptualized three orchestration 
processes for platform firms, i.e., innovation leverage, innovation coherence, and innovation 
appropriability.  
The lack of full-fledged accounts of the platform development process can be ascribed 
to the methodological difficulty of following platform development from the beginning. That 
issue encouraged our study of the nascent TRTG industry. Our study indicates how the extant 
studies only provided a partial account of the platform firms’ efforts at platform development. 
While our findings on innovation leverage and appropriation echo their orchestration processes 
(Dhanaraj & Parkhe, 2006; Nambisan & Sawhney, 2011), this paper advances these two 
frameworks and the following studies based on two main aspects. First, our framework 
embraces the uncertain and evolving nature of platform development in nascent settings and 
recognises it as a continuous and dynamic process (de Reuver et al., 2018; Gawer, 2014) driven 
by the platform firm’s appropriate capabilities. We do that by outlining the platform firm’s 
gradually deployed capabilities that underpin the iterating transition between innovation 
outputs and market demand under the constraints of quality control and appropriation 
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mechanisms, thereby offering a more comprehensive representation of the platform 
development process, especially for the pursuit of platforms in nascent industries. 
Secondly, and for the identified capabilities, our observations suggest that platform 
firms should maintain not only their relevance (as in the framework of Nambisan & Sawhney 
(2011)) but also (and more specifically) the quality of their innovation outputs whenever 
managing network stability (as in the framework of Dhanaraj & Parkhe (2006)). Meanwhile 
they raise the importance, in platform development, of market exploration that is effected by 
employing a mix of activities, rather than simply relying on the network effect, pricing 
strategies and other standalone activities. Below, we focus on quality control and market 
exploration to provide further discussion in relation to the literature.  
Advancing the understanding of quality control in platform development. Despite 
the delicate tension between complement quality and quantity, the quality issue in platform 
businesses is still under-researched. Most of the existing studies focus on platform features and 
relative quality (e.g., Suarez & Lanzolla (2007), Tellis et al. (2009), McIntyre (2011) and Zhu 
& Iansiti (2012)), but provide insufficient reference of the control mechanisms that a platform 
can actually use for complement quality (Jacobides et al., 2018; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017). 
Some of the recent studies (Eaton et al., 2015; Ghazawneh & Henfridsson, 2013; Kornberger, 
2017; Kyprianou, 2018) have discussed the issue, using cases such as iPhone and Wikipedia, 
and their results in general indicate the need for platform firms and their complementors’ to 
continuously adjust and align the quality standard and the complement quality.  
Platforms that aim to produce products of both high cost and quality (e.g., medical 
products), however, may not want to rely on this lengthy and costly alignment process due to 
the high development costs and the risk of low quality complements. While our results do echo 
the discussion of “continuous efforts” noted in the above studies, they take a clear departure 
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from them by recommending a mixed mechanism made up of both control of and support for 
high quality complements (e.g., see the observed activities of TRTG-Provider in Table 2). 
Although doing so means that these platform firms will have to retain more responsibility 
themselves, it also reduces uncertainty and risk, facilitates firm collaboration, and helps better 
explain and communicate their innovation outputs and their vision of the industry. Such 
received benefits can prompt more potential complementors to join the platform at its early 
stages (Ozcan & Eisenhardt, 2009; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009).  
Advancing the understanding of market exploration in platform development. One 
of the most promising features of platform is its ability at self-enhancement based on the 
network effects. As a result, past platform studies often focus on the first-mover advantage due 
to the network effects of platforms, and the suggested winner-takes-all outcomes (Lee et al., 
2006). Platforms at their early stages, however, often face the chicken-and-egg problem 
(Caillaud & Jullien, 2003; Kyprianou, 2018; McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; McIntyre & 
Subramaniam, 2009), which occurs when the network effects alone become insufficient to 
drive platform growth forward. Recent studies show that the network effects of an established 
platform may also be restricted, for instance, due to the network structure of its complementors 
and customers (Lee, Song & Yang, 2015; Zhu & lansiti, 2019).  
While most scholars emphasize the use of appropriate pricing, such as that resulting from 
subsidizing one side of the platform (Boudreau & Jeppesen, 2015; Parker & Alstyne, 2005; 
Rochet & Tirole, 2003, 2006), some have started to draw attention to other practices, such as 
the exemplar role played by platform firms (Cennamo, 2016; Gawer & Cusumano, 2014) and 
the role played by early adopters (Frattini, Bianchi, Massis & Sikimic, 2014), both of which 
were adopted by TRTG-Provider. Our observations, therefore, provide further evidence on the 
limits of network effects in platform discussions, and suggest that platform firms should adopt 
PLATFORM DEVELOPMENT                                                                                          35 
©Shi, Li & Chumnumpan, 2020 
 
proactive and concurrent marketing activities so as to effectively communicate with the market 
and increase the odds of developing successful platforms.  
Firm Boundaries for Deploying the Capabilities 
Firms need to re-contextualize their business journey on an ongoing basis (Garud, 
Gehman & Giuliani, 2014). This aspect is particularly important in nascent industries where 
businesses must constantly react to the changing context (Dattée et al., 2018). Our findings 
provide a processual view of a business venture in nascent settings that is deploying the desired 
capabilities for platform development by altering its firm boundaries. In the remainder of this 
subsection, we revisit the boundary changes of TRTG-Provider and then discuss how the 
findings of our study extend the theories of entrepreneurial firms’ boundary decisions and 
platform firms’ integrative capabilities, respectively.  
Revisiting the boundary changes of TRTG-Provider. The lack of conceptual clarity 
and consistency found in the TRTG industry, although largely non-problematic in everyday 
conversations, continued to cause significant problems when setting boundaries and 
developing business strategies. This observation is consistent with the less bounded and less 
predefined nature of entrepreneurial activities in the digital context (Nambisan, 2017).  
As indicated in Table 3, TRTG-Provider was carefully defining and redefining its firm 
boundaries. Although different business players in the TRTG industry may have had the 
potential to develop the reusable innovation assets needed to achieve innovation leverage, a 
modular product design based on clinically approved therapy knowledge could be more 
desirable. In terms of market exploration and appropriation, TRTG publishers were given more 
attention because they dealt with the market directly and determined the overall profits to be 
gained from the innovation outputs. In terms of quality control, those who possessed clinically 
approved therapy knowledge could set the bottom line for product quality, and those who 
controlled market routes had the final word on which complementary innovation outputs 
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should be released. Therefore, it was vital to act as both a publisher and a therapy knowledge 
provider in the TRTG industry. The foundation of TRTG-Provider was its therapy knowledge. 
It was developed based on the entrepreneur’s own research (see Phase 1: research in Table 3), 
and the business was then founded as a TRTG publisher thereafter (see Phase 2: business 
formation in Table 3 and in Figure 3). 
In addition, this studied entrepreneur founded one game studio and one middleware 
designer firm to support the TRTG-Provider’s business development (see Phase 3: platform 
emergence and Phase 4: platform development in Table 3 and in Figure 3). More specifically, 
the game studio developed prototype games for TRTG-Provider to attract early adopters in the 
market and set a quality standard to be followed by other game studios. Therefore, the game 
studio did support TRTG-Provider by enhancing its market exploration and quality control 
abilities. Meanwhile, the middleware designer firm was dedicated to coding TRTG-Provider’s 
therapy knowledge (i.e., core component) into the game engine that could then be reused by 
other game studios for game development, namely, the boundary resources that connected the 
game studios and the therapy knowledge. The game engine also acted as a black box to protect 
the therapy knowledge from infringement by others. Therefore, the middleware designer firm 
supported TRTG-Provider by enhancing its innovation leverage and quality control abilities.  
Extending the theories of platform firms’ boundary decisions. A firm’s boundary 
choice is a vital, yet complex, decision (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005). Based on studies of 
vertical integration and strategic outsourcing (e.g., Jacobides & Winter (2005), Jacobides & 
Billinger (2006), Holcomb & Hitt (2007), and Jacobides (2008)), scholars have noted that a 
firm’s boundary choice can have a major impact on its capabilities. As stated by Teece (2007: 
1331), “a company’s integration upstream, downstream, as well as externally, is partly driven 
by the need to build capabilities, particularly when such capabilities are not widely distribute 
in the industry.” However, the existing literature provides insufficient evidence of the boundary 
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dynamics during the early stage of businesses (Nason, Wiklund, McKelvie, Hitt & Yu, 2019; 
Zenger, Felin & Bigelow, 2011) including the boundary decisions of platform firms. To extend 
that existing literature, this paper illustrated how an actual business venture defined and refined 
its firm boundaries by integrating selective roles in the industry—thereby enabling it to deploy 
the desired capabilities to gain the upper hand in developing platforms. 
Since flexible boundaries allow firms to access more resources but with less control 
(Nason et al., 2019), firms need to decide very carefully what activities need to be done 
internally and what activities need to be conducted externally. When planning firm boundaries 
for their early stages, firms tend to focus on areas that can provide the highest cash leverage 
(Jacobides & Winter, 2007) and/or areas that cannot be encroached upon by other players 
(Zander, 2007). These viewpoints, however, only partly explain the business development of 
TRTG-Provider. It was founded as a TRTG publisher because its entrepreneur saw the financial 
importance of this role and realized that no other firms could or would take it on. Yet adopting 
these viewpoints alone tends to overlook the importance of boundary decisions in platform 
development. Our results show that the appropriate planning of firm boundaries can also allow 
platform firms to deploy the four capabilities and increase the odds of developing successful 
platforms. Therefore, the current paper extends the understanding of firm boundaries by 
answering the call from Nambisan (2017) for the drivers of platform firms’ fluid boundaries 
and the calls from earlier works for this same line of research (e.g., Schreyögg & Sydow (2010) 
and Gawer (2014)).  
Our observations of the boundary dynamics also revealed the continuous coordination 
between the platform firm and the complementors, by showing how the platform firm develops 
its boundary resources (e.g., game engine) based on the complementors’ (i.e., game studios) 
resources and requirements. In this regard, we showed that boundary resources can be 
developed with the inputs from both platform firms and complementors (Eaton et al., 2015; 
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Svahn et al., 2017). However, different from their findings that emphasize the shared control 
between platform firms and complementors when developing the boundary resources, our case 
indicated there was a predominant role of the platform firm in that process. This role is largely 
due to the high development costs and uncompromisable quality of medical products, which 
cannot afford the low quality outputs caused by over-involvement and over-control of 
complementors who have insufficient knowledge about the products and the market. Therefore, 
our results do suggest that platform firms and complementors’ involvement in the development 
of boundary resources should differ in different cases; that is, platform firms who have a better 
understanding of the products and market need to take on more responsibilities for developing 
boundary resources and encouraging complementors to participate. 
Extending the theories of platform firms’ integrative capabilities. The dynamic 
capabiliteis of firms often need to rely on external sources in addition to their own (Giudici et 
al., 2018; Zeng & Mackay, 2019). Consistent with this observation, Helfat and Raubitschek 
(2018) propose that integrative capabilities are important for platform firms in order to 
coordinate their complementors and other stakeholders in the ecosystem, a proposition that was 
empirically evidenced by our study of the TRTG industry. While in contradiction to one key 
argument of Helfat & Raubitschek (2018), we show that platform firms with such integrative 
capabilities do not always shrink their firm boundaries and rely more heavily on other business 
partners; that is, sometimes they expand their firm boundaries and play selective roles in the 
ecosystem with the aim of deploying the four capabilities of platform development.  
More specifically, our empirical evidence illustrates how a business venture performed 
its integration, both internally and externally, by expanding its business operations, setting up 
new collaborative firms, and coordinating relationships with others in the ecosystem. 
Throughout this process, this business venture deployed and enhanced the four capabilities for 
platform development. It evolved from one that focused on developing therapy knowledge to 
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a platform leader that plays multiple roles in the ecosystem (e.g., a publisher and therapy 
knowledge provider) and coordinated different relationships with other business players (e.g., 
the middleware designer firm and game studio of the same entrepreneur, other game studios, 
and hardware providers) and other stakeholders (e.g., in the TRTG market). Similarly, we see 
platform firms from many other sectors (e.g., Apple, Sony and Intel) have expanded their firm 
boundaries (e.g., through internal growth and acquisitions) to integrate their selective roles and 
assets when developing their platforms.  
One main reason for the contradiction here can be that the existing platform literature 
pays insufficient attention to the platform firm’s manipulative role in the ongoing process. For 
instance, prior studies often consider the availability of complementors as an exogenously 
determined fact, rather than an asset that should be strategically developed and maintained 
through the platform firm’s continuous investment (McIntyre & Srinivasan, 2017; McIntyre & 
Subramaniam, 2009). A platform, once successfully developed, can allow the platform firm to 
focus on its core activities and enjoy its complementors’ inputs (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; 
Schilling, 2000; Thomas et al., 2014); i.e., a shrunken firm boundary due to successful 
integration of its complementors’ supporting activities. However, to successfully develop such 
a platform does require investment in resources and capabilities to create, integrate and manage 
the ecosystem (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2018; Teece, 2018b), which can then result in an 
expanded firm boundary. In this respect, our investigation encourages a rethinking of platform 
firms’ boundaries that can shrink and expand, based on increased complementors’ support and 
the need of resources and the capabilities for platform development, respectively.  
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we presented a study of the UK’s nascent TRTG industry to shed further 
light on the platform phenomenon. Our rich, longitudinal data enabled us to develop a thick 
description and contextualized theoretical understanding of the emergence and development of 
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an innovation platform. Our observations extended our theoretical understanding of the 
platform phenomenon and in particular platform emergence in nascent industries. By 
unpacking the platform development process into actual capabilities and specific activities that 
can be deployed by firms, we encourage businesses to consider them as epistemic guidance for 
successful platform development.  
Our results shed light on other sectors beyond TRTG, such as video games, web 
browsers, and smartphones, all of which have experienced a similar platform development 
process to the one illustrated in our holistic framework. Consistent with what we predict, many 
of the platform firms in these sectors have managed to alter their firm boundaries and integrate 
selected roles in their respective ecosystems, while also developing their innovation platforms 
and increasing their attractiveness to the market and the complementors. These insights may 
also help us better understand the emergence of certain transaction platforms. For instance, 
through a series of acquisitions (e.g., NabeWise, Localmind, Accomable, Luxury Retreats 
International, and Tilt), Airbnb integrated new services, including city guides, location-specific 
information, accessible travel, villa rentals, and social payments to create new segments (i.e., 
market exploration) and also provide better services (i.e., quality control), more product 
categories (i.e., innovation leverage), and more payment options (i.e., appropriation), to 
enhance its hospitality platform. 
This study of course has limitations. Like any qualitative case study, the research was 
based on a single industry, which may limit the generalization of its findings and conclusions 
to other contexts. However, we do maintain that these results enhance our understanding of 
platform development by business ventures overall. This study is based on exploratory work, 
which is also expected to inform and encourage subsequent research. Future research could 
conduct econometric analyses to test the relationships between the four noted capabilities 
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further and examine their integrative impact on platform development overall. Analytic and 
simulation modelling could also shed even greater light on the entire phenomenon.  
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FOOTNOTES 
1 In general, the terms nascent industry and nascent market are used interchangeably in the prior 
literature (Benner & Tripsas, 2012; Zuzul & Tripsas, 2020). For consistency, we use the term 
nascent industry in this paper to illustrate TRTG.    
2 The data for this study were collected from informants by means of the business model canvas 
due to its widespread popularity. For simplicity of presentation and discussion, the data (i.e., 
observed business activities) were organized around the four business model pillars—value 
proposition, customer interface, infrastructure management, and financial aspects.  
3 Each field visit took half a day. As soon as the researchers arrived at the site, they were 
welcomed by the entrepreneur and introduced to the rest of the firm. The fieldwork included 
observing its business operations (i.e., what the firm was working on and how) and the 
prototype TRTG games that were being developed. Then the researchers and the entrepreneur 
had a conversation in the meeting room, when the entrepreneur clarified what the researchers 
had just seen. 
4 The identified capabilities are specific in relation to platform development. For instance, our 
data did not indicate the broader innovation capabilities, because all the firms that were actively 
operating in this industry possessed their own expertise of certain type and/or level, but what 
more concerning and challenging was the ability to integrate the expertise of different players 
to allow faster product development with lower cost; i.e., innovation leverage.  
5 In the home video game industry, games were initially (until the end of the 1970s) burned 
onto console chips and sold as single products. The second generation of consoles started to 
introduce cartridge-based consoles that enabled third parties to develop games that could later 
be added on. However, as the industry did not have a functional quality control mechanism, 
many low-quality games flooded the market and destroyed consumer trust, which led to the 
North American video game crash of 1983. 
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Table 1 
Key challenges to be addressed in the TRTG industry 
Second-order codes Selective quotes on first-order codes 
1. Market demand (for 
innovation outputs)  
1.1. User characteristics - aging patients 
Quote-1.1.1: “These are people who dislike advanced technologies or complex devices, especially computers. They did not grow up with the technology so many of them are scared of new technologies”. 
(Interview notes: Regional division deputy chief executive of a charity for the elderly) 
Quote-1.1.2: “The current ‘older population’, as highlighted in the quotation below, are faced with emerging technologies that were not in existence in their former years. “Well, if they’ve not been at 
the age where that technology came in, they just haven’t a clue have they? I mean, my mum’s starting to forget how to use the video recorder a lot of years ago. I used to have to write a whole sequence 
of what to do, you know, if she wanted to record anything o just simply play something back. But that stopped about six years ago. She just couldn’t even comprehend that. Couldn’t even follow 
instructions. So that was taken away.” (Caregiver 5)” (Research notes shared by our collaborative user uptake team)  
1.2. Product awareness and market confidence 
Quote-1.2.1: “In a focus group we conducted with stroke survivors, immense levels of frustration were articulated when members described their experiences of not getting any information about 
devices that could help them. June, 62, finally discovered [a product for stroke patients]. It was only after other members of a stroke support group informed her about its availability that she was 
able to know about its existence. […] Alan, 64, vocalized similar resentment towards the healthcare profession: “They [hospitals] don’t tell you about these things”. […] Many others described the 
process of getting information as a struggle between them and professional caregivers or public bodies. John who looks after his wife who has various chronic conditions said, you’ve got to be persistent. 
And you’ve got to be prepared to be pushed from here to there to there to there”. (Research notes shared by our collaborative  user uptake team) 
Quote-1.2.2: “The lack of engagement in markets means that individuals may be unfamiliar with purchasing such devices and services. […] Evidence supporting the use of such technologies is 
limited. […] Evaluation methods need to be developed and extended that can analyse the impacts of such products. […] A systematic review of the literature demonstrated a dearth of publication 
in this area. Without robust evidence of cost-effectiveness the opportunities for growth in the market may be limited.” (Research notes shared by our collaborative economic modelling team) 
1.3. Regulatory barriers 
Quote-1.3.1: “The rules and regulations are killing healthcare start-ups, especially when they have a product or service to be commercialized. Many such companies die out before they can even start 
selling anything. The last labour government set up a committee to investigate what made a successful SME in medical devices industry, and the very sad conclusion was that you are only successful if 
you first launched in America, since their regulations are pro-commercialization of medical devices not against”. (Interview notes: Founder of TRTG-Provider)  
Quote-1.3.2: “Even though our business started in 2001, we could not roll out our products until 2005 because it takes very long time to get approval from the policy and regulating agencies”. 
(Interview notes: CEO of a UK ALTS provider—tele-health 1) 
Quote-1.3.3: “Policies and regulations are far from straightforward. For instance, marketing, distribution and sale of certain products are subject to the requirements of various federal, state, and 
local laws and regulations”. (Notes taken from the facilitated workshops) 
Quote-1.3.4: “In the UK market, this is a different story as the barriers are much higher than what we have experienced in other countries. This is a nightmare.” (Interview notes: UK marketing 
director of the Spanish TRTG provider) 
2. Appropriation 
mechanisms (to profit 
from innovation outputs 
and reward 
complementors) 
2.1. Users are not payers  
Quote-2.1.1: “The UK model for delivering health and social care has encouraged a perception, amongst anyone born since the introduction of the welfare state that the state will look after their 
needs as they grow older. This contrasts with the different approaches in other countries, some of which are insurance based and some where a defined contribution system operates.” (Interview notes: 
Manager of a UK consulting firm) 
Quote-2.1.2: “In our projects, we had extensive focus groups with a range of elderly, and whilst all were enthusiastic about the integrated health social care, community care and social inclusion 
services potentially offered through [their product] as a one stop shop, very few considered purchasing equipment for themselves and thought that the equipment should be paid for by the NHS or 
social services as a point of principle mostly. […] Tele-health also does not really fit into the current insurance models in the UK while the US is starting to look at Tele-health in an insurance 
environment.” (Interview notes: CEO of a UK ALTS provider—tele-health 1) 
Quote-2.1.3: “When discussing costs, it is also important to remember that older people are often not purchasers. Devices and services are often bought and paid for on their behalf either by family 
and friends or by local authorities and the NHS. Many of our sample had been bought small devices as gifts by their immediate family and stressed that they wouldn’t have thought to buy them for 
themselves.” (Research notes shared by our collaborative user uptake team) 
2.2. UK healthcare financing system 
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Quote-2.2.1: “One of the key challenges in the UK is the way in which social and health care services are currently funded. […] In some local councils, users could use [personal budget] to employ 
caregivers but not be used to purchase such products while in some other local councils, the reverse is the case. […] In contrast to the market in the UK, some of the international firms we studied 
have not relied as heavily on the state-funded market. Several companies, for instance those from the Netherlands, have focused on a mixed model, primarily a combination of the government and the 
insurance funded markets”. (Notes taken from the facilitated workshops) 
Quote-2.2.2: “Problems in the insurance market mean that there are problems identifying who should pay for social care. Failure in the insurance market requires government intervention. 
Intervention means that individuals do not insure privately to protect against old age. This leads to individuals not engaging in the market.” (Research notes shared by our collaborative economic 
modelling team) 
2.3. Profit distribution among collaborators 
Quote-2.3.1: “The full benefits are seen when a service is redesigned and this is costly as it requires changing relationships between organizations and often the flows of finance. This creates winners 
and losers and unless there is a strong political will to implement strategically, implementation can falter.” (Interview notes: CEO of an UK ALTS provider – broadband access in the rural areas) 
Quote-2.3.2: “ALTS [including TRTG] require close collaboration between different industries, from health and social care, computing and telecommunications, to manufacturing, home electronics, 
transportation and construction. What needs to be developed is not only a common standard for interoperability, but also a cross-industry eco-system to co-create and distribute value”. (Notes taken 
from the facilitated workshops) 
3. Economies of scope 
(for innovation outputs; 
that is, more fun games at 
limited cost) 
3.1. Cost of product development 
Quote-3.1.1: “One challenge that all organizations in this domain face is committing time and effort [which they do not have] to undertaking design work that involves potential users from an early 
stage of development. We noted how there is sometimes a preference from some organizations to have insights provided to them, preferring to be informed about user insights and not directly engage 
with them”. (Research notes shared by our collaborative user uptake team) 
Quote-3.1.2: “Despite strategic interests from some traditional ALTS providers and large multinationals from other sectors, the ALTS market is primarily served by a large number of SMEs, 
many of them new start-ups. Many rely on side activities to sustain their activities, such as R&D income from different funding bodies, government grants and subsidies, cash injection from owners 
or investors, or income from traditional ALTS products and services”. (Notes taken from the facilitated workshops) 
3.2. Fun in “playing” TRTG 
Quote-3.2.1: “Part of the challenge for rehabilitation is that it is so depressing because previously you could move your body or specific part and now you cannot. At the beginning the patients think 
they are still alive, which is a good thing but as months go by if you don’t see improvement that can become really difficult. So, one of the things I like about the idea of using video games in 
rehabilitation is that it keeps the process more fresh and fun - also much easier to trace the patients improvement and progress”. (Interview notes: Entrepreneur in the field of serious games) 
Quote-3.2.2: “We no longer simply use technology, rather we live it, and we need to design [electronic and digital assisted living] technologies and services that are aesthetically pleasing, flexible, 
support changing needs, increase users’ independence and empower them”. (Research notes shared by our collaborative user-centred design team) 
4. Quality control 
mechanisms (to manage 
quality of innovation 
outputs) 
4.1. Knowledge and skills to ensure quality  
Quote-4.1.1: “For many designers, the technical performance of the product is the main factor that gets carefully considered. But taking account of the social and environmental context within which 
a product is used, for example movement or falls detectors for those with early dementia who still live independently at home, is as important as the technical performance of the product.” (Interview 
notes: Manager of a UK consulting firm)  
Quote-4.1.2: “Occasionally some ALTS-related products are not effective or efficient - they can shift extra work onto older people and their caregivers; they can work to dehumanize an older person 
by causing stigma and changing the relationship of care. However, older people can subvert the intended function of the products and resist these dehumanization effects by using the device selectively, 
or not at all. […] Some of the tele-care devices have been wanting in terms of their reliability and robustness. Combining advanced monitoring equipment in domestic environments and elderly users 
is a challenge where technology has to be bombproof. Some developers have not really grasped this yet”. (Notes taken from the facilitated workshops) 
Quote-4.1.3: “As such, designing from the ‘bottom-up’ and creating applications that are driven by end-user aspirations and sense-making around their condition rather than ‘top-down’ from the 
needs of service providers provides a rich space to explore new business models around emerging technologies.” (Research notes shared by our collaborative user-centred design team) 
Quote-4.1.4: “We tried to approach [a major game publisher] to get the source of the game in order to reconfigure the webcam based on our requirements, but they were scared to do such things as it 
had ‘healthcare’ name on it. […] We went to a very big studio, but they failed to produce a good game because they didn’t have the skills. So I believe if such an experienced team cannot develop a 
complex control, no one can do it and therefore there is a very big gap in the market”. (Interview notes: Founder of TRTG-Provider) 
4.2. Business models to ensure quality 
Quote-4.2.1: “The publisher model [for financing and quality control] is still dominating the console market, and I don’t see a better way to replace it. If you discover a better business model, please 
come and see me so we can all become rich [by creating a business from it]”. (Interview notes: University academic 1 in the field of serious games) 
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Quote-4.2.2: “Most providers lacked the resources, capabilities and large scale infrastructure required to provide higher value, longer term, contract-based, supported services, which limited their 
business model options to providing stand-alone, single or limited function products that are difficult to install, maintain and use”. (Notes taken from the facilitated workshops) 
Table 2 
Observed activities from TRTG-Provider 
Key challenges to be 
addressed (see Table 1) 
Summary narrative of observed activities from TRTG-Provider  
Selective Quotes from Interviews with the Founder of 
TRTG-Provider 
1. Market demand (for 
innovation outputs) 
(A). Pricing strategies – The activity started from Phase 2: business formation. TRTG-Provider 
started to evaluate different pricing strategies (i.e., through continuous market research, and 
communication and/or negotiation with market and business partners, to determine the optimal 
pricing strategy) to stimulate market adoption; the main purpose of the pricing strategies was to 
increase adoption rather than profit.  
(B). The role of early adopters – This activity started from Phase 2: business formation. TRTG-
Provider was actively conducting clinical trials (i.e., by communicating and collaborating with 
healthcare providers) to convince some users of the product’s efficacy and to become early 
adopters, so as to influence others to adopt; in Phase 4: platform development, it also planned to get 
endorsement from GPs and therapists to promote the product.   
(C). Exemplar role of platform firm – This activity started from Phase 3: platform emergence. 
Through the affiliated game studio, TRTG-Provider could receive prototype games and showcase 
them to the market to drive market adoption (i.e., through continuous customer engagement).  
(D). Multisided market creation – TRTG-Provider started to share its market routes (e.g., the 
medical device distributor) with affiliated game studio from Phase 3: platform emergence, and with other 
game studios from Phase 4: platform development. The resulted network effect could attract more users 
due to the increased innovation outputs; i.e., more TRTG games to “play”.  
Quote-1.a: “For the health service [providers] it doesn’t matter whether the 
product costs 1,000 or 2,000 [GBP], because that's cheap for them. But, 
for self-purchase, it's a different story. So, there are different markets, 
different aims, and different specifications.” 
Quote-1.b: “The technology has been recognised with the [Health Innovation 
Prize 1] 2009, [Health Innovation Prize 2] 2010 and [Health Innovation 
Prize 3] 2011 […] We probably need to get endorsement from the GPs 
and therapists to tell the patients that this is a good product. But we don't 
want them to prescribe our product now—this is the next level of sales and 
marketing.” 
Quote-1.c: “I believe that both the FDA and MHRA are going to come 
out with regulatory conformity guidelines. We would be able to pass those 
regulations and register our product as an approved medical device. [But 
now] the issue is holding this company back because professional purchasing 
[e.g., from the NHS and local authorities] cannot be done before we pass 
comply with the regulations. [TRTG-Provider] decided to go to the market 
first through a self-purchase approach, like people are coming to buy it in [a 
UK leading medical product distributor], where you don't need a commission 
group to decide that you are valid.” 
2. Appropriation 
mechanisms (to profit 
from innovation outputs and 
reward complementors) 
(E). Monetizing from innovation outputs – This activity started from Phase 2: business formation. 
TRTG-Provider as a TRTG publisher had been developing different revenue models for different 
market routes in order to profit from the market (i.e., through continuous negotiation with the 
healthcare financing bodies, intermediates and other potential payers), and it had been trying to 
protect the revenue streams from competitors (e.g., through patenting, and product modular design 
based on the game engine of the entrepreneur’s middleware designer firm). It decided to enter the 
self-purchase market and then gradually move to the regulated one (i.e., after obtaining regulatory 
approval).  
(F). Rewarding complementors – This activity started from Phase 4: platform development. TRTG-
Provider had been developing agreed-upon revenue models with other stakeholders (i.e., through 
continuous negotiation) to ensure that they could retain the value in relation to their contributions.  
Quote-2.a: “The IP will eventually arise. So, [TRTG-Provider] as a 
publisher stands alone and then we have these two companies [i.e., game 
studio and middleware designer firm]. The market is very new in terms of 
this structure, and is very new in terms of how you are going to enter the 
market. Now [TRTG-Provider], I think, is quite exposed.”  
Quote-2.b: “We were lucky to hit the right person in [the medical product 
distributor]. We’ve gone through their innovation programmes and, out of 
thousands of products, they selected six to take forward, one of which is ours. 
[…] Our pricing strategy will be decided after the final negotiations; because 
it is an innovation package, they will decide whether or not to co-invest in the 
development process.”  
3. Economies of scope (for 
innovation outputs; that is, 
(G). Product modular design – This activity started from Phase 3: platform emergence. Through the 
middleware designer firm of the entrepreneur, TRTG-Provider could integrate its core therapy 
knowledge (i.e., developed through continuous R&D) into a game engine, which helped its affiliated 
Quote-3.a: “At the moment, we are going to the patient self-purchase 
market. We have a product at the moment that needs to be diversified […]. 
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more fun games at limited 
cost) 
game studio and other game studios produce TRTG games. Meanwhile, as TRTG-Provider did not 
have to share the therapy knowledge directly with game studios, such modular design may also help 
preserve its core intellectual property.  
(D). Multisided market creation – TRTG-Provider started to share its market routes (e.g., the 
medical device distributor) with affiliated game studio from Phase 3: platform emergence, and with other 
game studios from Phase 4: platform development. By doing so, game studios could access more users 
and became more motivated to develop TRTG games for the platform.  
So what we need is to have a portfolio of products [games] round these 
movements that we have already programmed.” 
Quote-3.b: “[…] with regards to digital products, the introduction of 
software that could be operated on mass-market platforms (such as iPhone 
and other mobile devices) has the potential to significantly reduce development 
and product costs and thus, increase uptake of these technologies.” 
4. Quality control 
mechanisms (to manage 
quality of innovation 
outputs) 
(H). Right to audit – This activity started from Phase 4: platform development. As a TRTG publisher, 
TRTG-Provider could audit the TRTG games of game studios to ensure that only those qualified 
(e.g., through continuous market research, customer engagement and communication with 
healthcare providers to understand the market demand and quality standard) were released to the 
market through its market channels.  
(G). Product modular design – This activity started from Phase 3: platform emergence for 
collaborative product development. Then in Phase 4: platform development, it also worked as a quality 
control mechanism. Through the middleware designer firm of the entrepreneur, TRTG-Provider 
could integrate its therapy knowledge into a game engine. It could ensure that game studios’ games 
would meet the required medical requirements as long as they were developed based on its game 
engine.  
(C). Exemplar role of platform firm – This activity started from Phase 3: platform emergence to 
increase market adoption. Then in Stage 4: platform development, through its affiliated game studio, 
TRTG-Provider could also showcase the prototype games to other game studios as a quality 
standard to be followed (i.e., through continuous communication and coordination).  
Quote-4.a: “All medical devices should first deliver whatever they say on the 
box. You've got to conform to safety issues and labelling issues. It needs 
extensive specifications on safety. You also need to do risk analyses on how to 
minimize the risk, which we have done a lot of.”  
Quote-4.b: “What we are focusing upon is not gaming to preserve health—a 
healthy person can do exercise, while the game we are focusing at is basically 
for physiotherapy. […] In the rehabilitation context, if we ask a patient to 
do something through the controller, we want to know if he has done it 
EXACTLY or not. So what is missing is the ability of the game studios to 
program such complex controls, and there is no middleware provider to help 
them.”  
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Table 3 
Summary narrative of TRTG-Provider’s business & platform development 
 Phase I: research (pre-business)  Phase II: business formation Phase III: platform emergence Phase IV: platform development 
Key challenges to be 
addressed (see Table 
1) 
N/A Market demand (1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4) 
Appropriation mechanisms (2.1; 2.2) 
Market demand (1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4) 
Appropriation mechanisms (2.1; 2.2) 
Economies of scope (3.1; 3.2) 
Market demand (1.1; 1.2; 1.3; 1.4) 
Appropriation mechanisms (2.1; 2.2; 2.3) 
Economies of scope (3.1; 3.2) 
Quality control mechanisms (4.1; 4.2) 
Deployed 
capabilities & 
Observed activities 
(see Table 2) 
N/A Market exploration (A; B) 
Appropriation (E) 
Market exploration (A; B; C; D) 
Appropriation (E) 
Innovation leverage (G; D) 
Market exploration (A; B; C; D) 
Appropriation (E; F) 
Innovation leverage (G; D) 
Quality control (H; G; C) 
Firm boundary & 
Corresponding roles 
a of TRTG-Provider 
TRTG-Provider (pre-business): therapy 
knowledge developer  
 
TRTG-Provider: therapy knowledge developer 
and publisher 
 
TRTG-Provider: therapy knowledge developer 
and publisher 
Affiliated firms: game studio and middleware 
designer 
TRTG-Provider: therapy knowledge developer 
and publisher 
Affiliated firms: game studio and middleware 
designer 
Business 
development of 
TRTG-Provider 
The business was still in the preparation 
stage and the entrepreneur was focusing 
on the development of therapy 
knowledge for TRTG games 
It acted as a publisher and started to 
evaluate and explore different routes to 
the market. Meanwhile, it continued 
acting as a therapy knowledge developer 
It continued acting as publisher and 
therapy knowledge provider. It also 
worked closely with its affiliated game 
studio and middleware designer firm to 
develop the game engine and prototype 
games. 
It continued acting as publisher and 
therapy knowledge provider and working 
with its affiliated firms. Through the 
boundary resources, it also started to 
share therapy knowledge with other 
game studios to develop TRTG games 
Platform 
development 
 
Core component: under development 
Complementors: nonexistence 
Boundary resources: nonexistence 
Summary: the therapy knowledge was 
still under development, and no sign of 
the platform yet. 
Core component: therapy knowledge 
Complementors: nonexistence 
Boundary resources: nonexistence 
Summary: the therapy knowledge had 
been developed, but TRTG-Provider did 
not have a mechanism of sharing it with 
other firms to develop complements 
Core component: therapy knowledge 
Complementors: affiliated game studio only 
Boundary resources: game engine 
Summary: the platform started to 
emerge, but only worked as an internal 
one and with limited size; i.e., TRTG-
Provider commissioned its affiliated 
game studio to develop TRTG games 
based on its therapy knowledge and 
game engine 
Core component: therapy knowledge 
Complementors: all interested game studios 
Boundary resources: game engine; the rules of 
the game 
Summary: the platform continued 
growing due to the inclusion of external 
game studios; i.e., the therapy knowledge 
coded in the game engine was reused by 
other game studios to develop TRTG 
games 
Note a: see Figure 2 for the related business models for firms that play the different roles in this industry; i.e., publisher, game studio, middleware designer, and therapy knowledge developer.  
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
Key business players and business models in TRTG industry 
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Therapy Knowledge Provider
• Value proposition: develop therapy knowledge tailored for TRTG; that is, the most up-to-date scientific basis of successful therapy 
and the mechanisms that implant such therapy into rehabilitation-specific games;
• Customer interface: middleware designer;
• Infrastructure management: develop therapy knowledge to assist the development of TRTG games;
• Financial aspects: licensing; etc.
Hardware Providers
• Value proposition: develop consoles and motion 
sensing devices that support TRTG games - the 
existing consoles such as PlayStation and Xbox as well 
as PCs are sufficient to support the early TRTG games; 
the existing motion-sensing technologies (e.g. Wii 
remote, Kinect, Leap Motion, 3Gear and Razer Hydra) 
are capable to track human gestures in a moderately 
accurate manner; 
• Customer interface: publishers; or TRTG users who 
wish to buy TRTG games and hardware separately;
• Infrastructure management: develop and 
manufacture gaming consoles for TRTG;
• Financial aspects: sales to/through publishers; sales 
through existing channels to individual users.
Middleware Designers
• Value proposition: develop game engines that support game studios to develop TRTG games;
• Customer interface: game studios;
• Infrastructure management: develop game engines based on the clinically approved therapy knowledge;
• Financial aspects: sales of game engines as software; licensing; etc.
Game Studios
• Value proposition: develop action games for TRTG;
• Customer interface: publishers;
• Infrastructure management: develop qualified TRG games with the support of appropriate game engines;
• Financial aspects: work-for-hire; royalty-advance; etc. 
Publishers
• Value proposition: market the TRTG games (and hardware if needed); facilitate TRTG solutions to benefit respective customers;
• Customer interface: patients and patients  family and friends; healthcare providers; healthcare insurers; healthcare charities; government and local authorities; etc. 
• Infrastructure management: explore routes to the market for the TRTG games (and hardware if needed); obtain the required regulation approval; publishers also could 
play a key role in terms of auditing product quality and financing game studios;
• Financial aspects: retailing; in-game purchases; service based revenue models (e.g. subscription, pay for positive performance). 
TRTG Market 
• Healthcare Financing Sources: Government (Taxation), Social Healthcare Insurance, Private Healthcare Insurance, Healthcare Charities, Out of Pocket Payments
• Patients: End users of TRTG
• Healthcare Providers: Both Public and Private Healthcare Providers, e.g. NHS & Bupa Hospitals, Nursing & Care Homes, and assisted living communities
• Other Beneficiaries: Patients  family and friends, Local community, etc.
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Figure 3 
A holistic framework for platform development 
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APPENDIX 
Description of data 
Source of data Description Use in the analysis 
Project archival 
data. 
A total of 615 files saved in the project’s shared Dropbox account, including: project progress reports, 
draft and final reports, presentation slides, meeting agendas/minutes—organized quarterly, shared files 
from the three collaborative research teams and the studied ALTS and TRTG providers. 
To understand the research context. To support, integrate, 
and triangulate evidence from other sources.  
Interviews with UK 
TRTG stakeholders 
and UK ALTS 
providers. 
UK TRTG stakeholders (17):  
• TRTG providers (2): the entrepreneur* of a UK TRTG provider and the UK marketing director of a 
Spanish TRTG provider;  
• Tele-rehabilitation providers (2): the founders of two conventional tele-rehabilitation providers;  
• Potential adopters (8): five employees of the NHS, the regional division deputy chief executive of a 
charity for the elderly; the manager of a retirement community and the manager of a local council that 
was the leader in assisted living provision;  
• Experts in serious games (3): two academics and an entrepreneur in the field of serious games;  
• Others (1): the manager of a consulting firm that specialised in the ALTS market. 
To understand the industry context, map out the industry 
structure (Figure 2), and identify the key challenges in this 
nascent industry (Table 1). The aggregated view of the key 
stakeholders was likely to guide and shape the future 
development of the industry and its business players, to set a 
clear and reliable research context.   
UK ALTS providers (11): senior managers of firms that supplied elderly with communication systems (2); 
home control and alarm systems (4); information on mobility assistance (2); broadband access in rural 
areas (1); and tele-health systems (2). 
To complement the understanding of the industry with 
views from other ALTS providers.  
Shared findings 
and insights from 
three collaborative 
research teams in 
the field of ALTS. 
Shared data (research notes, case studies and project reports), monthly meetings as well as personal 
interactions and conversations with the three research teams:  
• Economic modelling team: estimated the financial and social benefits of ALTS (based on literature 
review and economic methods); 
• User uptake team: explored the factors that influenced the use and integration of ALTS (based on 
interviews, focus groups and field observation with 63 users, 12 formal and 21 informal caregivers); 
• User-centred design team: evaluated the user engagement methods for the ALTS design (based on 
three design case studies).  
To complement the understanding of the industry with the 
insights from other research teams. To triangulate the 
evidence emerging from interviews. 
Observations of 
TRTG-Provider. 
Field notes from two visits to TRTG-Provider, one at the beginning of the first year and one in the second 
year, to understand its products and business activities.  
To obtain an overall understanding of its business activities 
and products.  
Conversations with 
managers of 
TRTG-Provider. 
Regular contacts (at least monthly) with TRTG-Provider to collect data through emails, Skype meetings, 
and informal talks (ranging from brief exchanges to longer talks during work breaks), and attending its 
business meetings. 
To integrate the understanding of the industry, 
observations, and conversations, to investigate business 
development (Table 3) and activities (Table 2) of TRTG-
Provider during this process. 
Interview with the 
founder of TRTG-
Provider. 
One in-depth interview with the entrepreneur a to go through the business development of TRTG-
Provider since it was founded. 
To support, integrate and triangulate evidence from 
observations and conversations. To discuss insights drawn 
from observations and conversations.  
Facilitated 
workshops. 
The interviewees, members of three collaborative research teams and other interested parties were invited 
to the two workshops—one half way through of the project and the other at the end of it. 
To present and discuss preliminary findings to validate data, 
eliminate biases, and obtain additional feedback.  
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Note a: we conducted two interviews with the founder of TRTG-Provider. The first interview was held at the early stage of this research, with a focus on understanding this industry; the second 
interview was held in the second year of this research, with the purpose of further understanding TRTG-Provider’s business development. 
 
